INTRODUCTION
question, "Does postmodemism have a moral, ethical and values base?" appears as somethlng of a paradox. But, as ihe rightly recognises' she is not the first to ask the question' In p"ri"g this *questi,on, Hdlscher is merely following a long line of scholars, including Bauman, i"norJ postmodern Ethics (1993) form the theoretical backdrop to her discussion, and Foucault, whose ideas have been more influential than Bauman's on social work thinking (Chambon, Irving & Epstein, 1999; Hugman,2003 Hugman, ,2005 . In the social sciences Bauman (1995) , Benhabib (1992) , Foucault (2000) and Young (1990) have grappled with the implications of postmodernism for ethics and morality. In social work Atherton and Bollard (2003) , Gray (1995) , Hugman (2003, 2005) , parton 1te-e+; and Walker (2001) , among others, have critically examined the_ethical implications of ihe so-called "postmodern turn" in social work. In this paper the authors draw on the work of Berman (2000) Ethics'; (2005:237) . In postmodern terms ethical judgments and processes remain open-ended, relational and context-specific. There can be no universal transcendental values such as human rights and social justice which apply to all people everylvhere. Thus there can be no talk about judgments regarding universal values, such as respect for persons, human rights and social justiCe; no application of such values or ethical precepts in local contexts, where cinpletely different cultwal i,rles and moralities might apply, and where there might not even be such terms in local languages. In short, there can be no uriversally agreed-upon norns or codes; rather, each norm or code needs to be discursively constructed in particular situations in a process which can never be complete. In this respect it makes no sense to talk about moral certainty, and so postmodernity is r""tr ar contributing to the loss of the "...ability of modern institutions to ensure the moral conduct of individuals" (Hdlscher, 2005:239) ' Ethics as moral philosophy makes no pretence to prescribe or enforce standards of moral conduct, but rather highlights the complexity of moral matters and the need for a deep undostanding of morality so that individuals might choose or commit themselves to behave morally (Gray, 1993 (Gray, , 1995 . Philosophically, the limitations of ethics have been well documented (Williams, 1985) . The ;'postmodern turn" in ethics comes flom social theory or the transforming of ethics into a social science. This turn became evident in the 1960s, when utilitarianism established its dominance as the most acceptable ethical method by which the complex issues of modern pluralist societies could be addressed (Lovat, 2003 (Lovat, , 2004 (1995) (and Berman) to show how the original movement "...slipped from its moorings and tumed into a new petrified opinion of the sort it was supposed to transcend" (Berman,2000:219) . This'hew ism" is a "messianic program" which really is "monocultnralism" fbr "it does not take kindly to true difference" and, in many institutions ( Foucault's (1914) jargon of-"dominant discourse", "marginalized other" or "hegemonic curriculum", resulting in a "terrifying loss" in which we are "unwilling to defencl complicated S o cial lVorAMaatskap Ii ke llerk 2 006 : 42 ( 3/l) fi.uth,t, (1t)7 4:219 italics addecl). For Bemstein, multiculturalism "...is an ideology that is unau'are "i'iir.f frur an ideology" (Berman, 2000:219) . Importantly, Berman (2000:220) 'Everything is perfect'; 'Mo<lern physics confirms transpersonal psychology'; 'The planet is undergoing a transformatjon into consciousness'; and 'Transpersonal psychology will change the world'." (Berman, 2000 :222-223) Berman (2000 hopes that this addiction to paradigms will give rise to some "halfir'ay houses" or "twelve-st"p p.ogru*r" to help people break out of their addiction which, like drugs and aloohol, provides ihorfterm ecstasy while "robbing them of their real life", not to mention that such "blind mythologizing", as in the transpersonal psychology example cited above, is politically disastrous. Foi Beiman this "transpersonal lnanny", which "tums history into archetypical psychology and takes hermeneutics ... and postmodernism to be the new truth" is "r"ury;'^i8..11an,2000:233). He cites Hannah Arendt's comment that "...1he presumplion of any great, hidden purpose in history that is ineluctably working itself out and that must inevitably lead io ro.. rp..ifi"d outcome (good or bad)'is one of the most virulent and dangerous diseases of the modein age"'(Berman, ZOOO,ZZ+1. Thus utopian thought or the belief that all conflict will be resolved and that Western civilization rvill finally come to rest is what Albert Camus referred to as 'lrostalgia for the absolute" (Berman, 2000:224) . Citing Kant l.re says "...a revolution will never producJ true reform in ways of thinking. Instead new prejudices, like the ones they replaced, will serve as a leasl.r to control the greal unthinking mass" (Berman,2000.227) . For Berman this aptly captures "the whole process of paradignr merry-go-round" (Berman,2000:227) .
The new paradigm story of postmodernism is a classic case of an ideology-driven dubious logic, as is the story that "fbrninism will replace patriarchy" and "ecology rvill replace control of nature", treating these ideas as if they were scientific fact or prophecy of sorts (Bertnan, 2000; 227 (Davis, 1996; Doukas & Berg,2001; Kalbian & Shepherd,2003; Macklin, 1995; Magnusson, 1996; Miller & Brody,2002; Robertson,200l; Wendler & Shah, 2003; Zoloth,2002) .
The rest of this paper will be devoted to explaining this fundamental shift with reference to the insights of Wittgenstein and, especially, I{abennas.
WITTGENSTEIN AND RELATIVISM There are many concepts used in postrnodemism enranating from Wittgenstein's philosophy, whom Berman (2000) describes as a "spiritual rromad" -thc later Wittgenstein, anyway -'and "one of the greatest tl-rinkers of nrodern times" (Bennar-r,2000:192) . Wittgenstein embodies what Deleuze calls "rhizomatic thinking" -though ironically Deleuze saw no value in Wittgenstein's philosophy -which Berman describes as "paradox" or "spiritual nomadism", the sense of not .^inc anwvhere prccisely because it understands that, in the most fundan-rental sense, there is iJatli no*t "re to go. As the twelfth-century Zen rnaster, Ilakuin, said "--.without a destination, I u, *u". lost" (Berman, 2000:192 ,,Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must remain silent" (Rerman, 2000:194 HABERMAS AND ETHICS AS TRANSCENDENT Berman wants to drive home the point that any assertion of truth is necessarily a transcendent aotivity and Habermas (1912) would seem to agree when he postulates "self-reflectivity" as the supreme form of knowing. This is a form of knowing which is beyond that which can be formed liom empirical evidence and fiom human interaction. It is a knowing which comes ultimately from self-knowing in the way of the mystics of Judaism, Christianity and Islam (Lovat, 2006) . For Habermas, this knowing builds on the knowing that comes liom empirical evidence and, more importantly, on the knowing that comes from human commtutication. In this, Habermas is building partly on the edifice provided by the later Wittgenstein who insisted that "...every language-game is only possible if one trusts something" (in Berman, 2000:206) , thus "every language game presupposes that the communicating partners in the game take nulnerous facts for granted" (Berman, 2000:206) .
Karl-Otto Apel -a Habermasian ally -would later emphasise that "criticism presupposes a transcendental framework in order to have a critical discussion at all" for "all exarnination or discourse takes place within a system" (in Berman, 2000:206) and it is importarrt to know which system you are in or are using when conducting your critical analysis (IJabermas, 1994 In this context, it is worth noting that the epistemic concerns of Habermas (1972 Habermas ( , 1974 with communicative and reflective knowing resemble both the Aristotelian (Aristotle, 1985) and Thomist (Aquinas, 1936) concerns wilh "practical jr-rdgment" and the Husserlian (I-lusserl, 1958) concern w'ith slow pre-emptive judgment through prolonging openness to learning anew. Indeed, the connections between the I-Iabern-rasian and Husserlian world views have beon well explored, both by IJabermas himself (Habermas, 1985) and by others (Outhwaite, 1994; Rasrnussen, 1990 For Habcrmas, knowing required a heavy hermeneutic dimensior.r which ultimately could iead to tlre forms of seltknowing that underpin his notion of praxis (Habennas, 1912 (Habennas, , 1974 and of intersub.iective understanding that is at the heart of communicative competence (Habermas, 1984 (Habermas, , 1987 . For him, this owed much to l{usserlian pliilosophy. Thus he says that "praxis philosophy renewed by phenornenology and authropology ... has at its disposal the tools of the Hr"rsserlian analysis" (Habermas, 1985:317) and "communicative reason makes itself felt in the binding force of intersubjective understanding and reciprocal recognition" (Habermas, 1985:324 (Lovat' 2001)' In rhis context Habermas's understanding of the distinction bctween morals, valtles alld cthics is il";'.,;;il;"i,rg. eil.nv, as a followei of the Enlightenment tradition, Habertnas is a critical ii "".rri "File miaernity. As suggested above, he proposes that there are three ways in whiclt we ;;;;; k'ow rnotivatei by oui-cognitive l-ruman interests. Like Aristotle and Aquinas and the i.n-,'" fi,t" of Western philosophers ttiut follo* them, Ilabenr-ras places reason a1 the centre of lris :L;i".;"5; "r the means tlirough which we discern truth. At thc same time, he shorvs that rve havc i,,j",*a ilit.rent tlpes of kno"wleclge for different purposes. I1e speaks about errrpirical-analytical I Jr-r.i"ntirt. -knowing, historical--hermeneutical knowing arrd emancipatory knowing, which he ,.rp*i".fy places in tliiee spheres, the obiective, social arrd subiective-llis distinction between ;;i;;r, ethi..s and morals u., .o*"rponding to these three spheres is particularly helplul in uiJ..rtunang the various ways in which we use these conce;rts in social work.
It nrakes selse that values are relative and culturally contillgent J'ctcts. As flabermas retniuds us, ;;;t;r" objective in the sense that they are part of the social fabric of all societies in the same way ihui norr11otiue assumptions are part of o.t. "u..y day discussitlns -Ifabermas calls them speech u.,r. 1.fr.V are part of ihe language we use to express our ideus and communicate r'vith one another' It also makes sense that ethics, including professional ethics, belong in the soclrrl rcah.n, for they urise jior1, a social process of discussion -d d"but" wherein we agrce ol norms' both prolbssional and social, regarding what we see as right or just ibr the society in wllich we live and the profbssion to *tti"t'r *" are committed -in terms of the values we share that are common to our irofessiolal culture. Habermas calls this process whereby we reach agreement through rational iircrrsrion "commtmicative rationality". To use a concrete example, a code of ethics lbr social work is always the result of a dialogical process u'hich ends -albeit temporarily -when agreement is reached. lt then becomes a "norm" of practice that social work pro{'essionals should aihere to the agreed-upon code. lmportantly, this implies that codes of ethics change over time as new influenc., in kro*l"dge and technological development lead to cultural changes. People shape codes of ethics in relation to the society in which they are embedded and change them as societies change. Hence codes of ethics are social and political professional statements.
Most on the button was Habermas's placernent of tlorais in the subjective realm, believing that our moral beliefs are deeply personal matters, for only we can know whether or not we arc being true to our values. truthfulness is to the subjective, tnoral realm as rightness is to the social, ethical realm, and llabermas places emphasis on htov'ing ottrselves as the persotl cloing lhe htowing, as the subject trying to discern Kant's (1964) (Nussbaum, 2001 ) .
Sotne who miss a practical-mystical element in Habernras's thiuking see his comrnunicative rationality as highly proceduralised (Lovat, 2003 (Lovat, , 2004 Finally, Berman's (2000) "paradox" has a governing motif in Rilke's iniunction to "...live in the question and perhaps you will gradually, without noticing it, live along some distant day into the answer" (Berman, 2000:211) . This is the tradition of the later Wittgenstein and Gilles Deleuze. The point is to realize that reality a,r rs was the mystery you were seeking all along. It challenges our constant quest for solutions and reuinds us that "depths are on the surlace" (Wittgenstein, 1969) . After all our searching, we find what we were looking for right there "at horne" in our ordinary everyday lives. The truth is staring us right in the face, but we do not want to see it because we think we must dig for it, in complex er.npirical data and high-lcvel social science theorising. Wlro is to say lhat the grand solution or salvatiolt we seek might not prove to be.just as So cia I WorAM u ats kupli ke lVerk 2 006 : 42 ( 3/4) nnnressive as that which we seek to escape? The grass is never greener on the other side. Even iii-uputttt.ia South Aliica is beset by racism (Holscher, 2005 
